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In previous work, the current authors derived a mathematical expression for the 
optimal (or “saturation”) number of reinsurers for a given number of primary insurers (see 
Powers and Shubik, 2001).  In the current paper, we show analytically that, for large 
numbers of primary insurers, this mathematical expression provides a “square-root rule”; 
i.e., the optimal number of reinsurers in a market is given asymptotically by the square 
root of the total number of primary insurers.  We note further that an analogous “fourth-
root rule” applies to markets for retrocession (the reinsurance of reinsurance). 
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1.  Introduction 
In previous work, the current authors derived a mathematical expression for the 
optimal (or “saturation”) number of reinsurers for a given number of primary insurers (see 
Powers and Shubik, 2001).  Specifically, we identified the optimal number of reinsurers as 
the maximum value of   n1 ∈ 2,3,K,n0{ } such that the price per unit of primary insurance in 
a market with   n0  primary insurers and  n1 reinsurers remains less than the price of 
insurance in a market with   n0 +1  primary insurers and  n1 −1 reinsurers.  This marginal 
analysis yields 
  























































,                (1) 
and the existence of a unique solution  n1* ∈ 2,3,K,n0 −1{ } is guaranteed by the fact that 
the inequality in (1) is satisfied for  n1 = 2 , but not for  n1 = n0. 
Having computed   n1 * for values of  n0  in the interval  10,5000[ ], we presented a 
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 Figure 1.  Insurance/Reinsurance arket 
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From a tabular display of the same results (see Table 1), it is easy to see that the solution to 
(1),   n1 *, is approximately equal to the square root of  n0  (although this observation was not 



























Table 1.  Optimal Numbers of Reinsurers for Selected Numbers of Primary Insurers 
 
2.  A Square-Root Rule 
In the current research, we show analytically that, for large numbers of primary 
insurers, the solution to problem (1) is indeed a “square-root rule”; i.e., the optimal 
number of reinsurers in a market is given asymptotically by the square root of the total 
number of primary insurers, as stated formally in the following result. 
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Theorem 1:  For sufficiently large   n0 , there exists a unique solution 
  n1* = n1 * n0( )∈ 2,3,K,n0 −1{ } to problem (1), where 
  n1 * n0( )~ n0  
as   n0 → ∞ . 
Proof:  First, we extend problem (1) from the two-dimensional integer grid 
  n0 ,n1( ): 2 ≤ n1 ≤ n0{ } to the corresponding two-dimensional real space   a,x( ): 2 ≤ x ≤ a{ } by 

















































⎟ .                                                       (2) 
Apart from its points of unboundedness, (2) is equivalent to the cubic polynomial 
inequality 
  f x( )= 3a
2 − 3a+1( )x 3 − 5a3 + 3a2 − 5a+ 2( )x 2  
              + 9a
3 − 3a2 − a+1( )x + a4 − 3a3 + 3a2 − a( )> 0 .                                               (3) 
Thus, the unique solution specified by the theorem—if it exists—is given by   n1* = x *⎣ ⎦, 
where   x* = x * a( )∈ 2, a( ) is a positive real root of  f x( ) such that  ′ f x( )< 0. 

















































⎟ = 1+O a−2( ), 
from which it follows that we seek the roots  x a( ) of 
  
f x( )= 1+ x −1( )2O a−2( )[ ]a2 − x 2 − x −1+ x −1( )3O a−2( )[ ]a 
                                              
 
− x 3 − 2x 2 + x + x x −1( )2O a−2( )[ ]= 0 .                           (4) 




x 2 − x −1+ x −1( )3O a−2( )[ ]




x 2 − x −1+ x −1( )3O a−2( )[ ]2 + 4 1+ x −1( )2O a−2( )[ ]x 3 − 2x 2 + x + x x −1( )2O a−2( )[ ]
2 1+ x −1( )2O a−2( )[ ]
.      (5) 
Anticipating that there exists at least one positive root  x a( )= o a
2 3( ) to (4), we find 
exactly one solution to (5); namely, 
  
a=
ˆ x 2 +O ˆ x ( )
2 1+ o 1( )[ ]
+
ˆ x 4 +O ˆ x 3( )
2 1+ o 1( )[ ]
~ ˆ x 2 , 
which implies 
  ̂  x a( )~ a . 
For sufficiently large   a, it is clear that  ̂  x a( )∈ 2, a( ). 
To confirm that   ̂  x a( ) is the desired root of  f x( ), we consider the local extrema of 
this polynomial, given by 
  ′ f x( )= 3 3a




5a3 + 3a2 − 5a+ 2( )± 5a3 + 3a2 − 5a+ 2( )2 − 3 3a2 − 3a+1( ) 9a3 − 3a2 − a+1( )
3 3a2 − 3a+1( )
.             (6) 
As   a → ∞ , the two solutions to (6) are 
  
xL a( )=
5a3 + 3a2 − 5a+ 2( )− 5a3 + 3a2 − 5a+ 2[ ]2 + −81a5 +O a4( )[ ]
9a2 +O a( )
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−81a5 +O a4( )[ ]
2 5a3 + 3a2 − 5a+ 2( )+O a( )




a2 + o a2( )







5a3 +O a2( )+ 25a6 +O a5( )




respectively.  For sufficiently large   a, it follows that  ̂  x a( ) lies between  xL a( ) and   xU a( ), 
implying   ′ f ˆ x ( )< 0.  Therefore,   x * a( )= ˆ x a( ).                                                                                  
 
3.  Extension to Retrocession 
Beyond the world of ordinary reinsurance lie the misty realms of retrocession 
(second-order reinsurance), second-order retrocession (third-order reinsurance), and so 
on.  Although the model in our 2001 paper was extended to an arbitrary number of 
reinsurance levels, we acknowledged that such clearly defined levels are not reflective of 
the real world.  While a few specialized purveyors of retrocession do exist, higher-order 
reinsurance is typically provided by ordinary reinsurers through the packaging and 
repackaging of risk through various types of pooling arrangements. 
It may be argued that the absence of distinct higher-order reinsurance markets is 
consistent with the analytical results of our game-theoretic model.  Assuming that there 
exist at least two second-order reinsurers in the market, and again using the minimization 
of price in the primary insurance market as the optimality criterion, our expression for the 
optimal number of second-order reinsurers is given by: 
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.                                   (7) 
By methods analogous to those employed in the proof of Theorem 1, it is quite 
straightforward to show the following result. 
Theorem 2: For sufficiently large   n0 , if  n1 ~ n0 , then there exists a unique solution 
  n2* = n2 * n0( )∈ 2,3,K,n1 −1{ } to problem (7), where 
  n2 * n0( )~ n04  
as   n0 → ∞ . 
In short, the number of retrocessionaires in a market should be approximately equal 
to the fourth-root of the number of primary insurers, which for most national insurance 
markets (other than that of the U.S.) is rather small.  Thus, according to the model, one 
should not expect to see distinct significant retrocession markets, except perhaps in the 
U.S.  This result agrees with empirical observation. 
 
4.  A Comment on Paper on Paper 
More generally, for all financial instruments involving risk and transaction costs, 
the principles dictating how many levels of paper are economically optimal need to be 
considered.  We suspect that four or five is an extreme upper bound, and our result here 
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